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Discounted utilitarianism treats generations unequally and leads to seemingly unappealing 
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Both in the theory of economic growth and in the practical evaluation of economic
policy with long-term eﬀects (e.g., climate policies), it is common to apply the
discounted utilitarian (DU) criterion. DU means that one inﬁnite stream of con-
sumption is deemed better than another if and only if it generates a higher sum of
utilities discounted by a constant per period discount factor δ, where δ is positive
and smaller than one.
In spite of its prevalence, DU is controversial, both due to the conditions through
which it is justiﬁed and due to its consequences for choice in economically relevant
situations. As a matter of principle, DU gives less weight to the utility of future
generations and therefore treats generations in an unequal manner. If one abstracts
from the probability that the world will be coming to an end, thereby assuming that
any generation will appear with certainty, it is natural to question whether it is fair
to value the utility of future generations less than that of the present one. This
criticism has a long tradition in economics, dating back at least to Pigou (1932).
When applied to some models of economic growth, DU leads to seemingly un-
appealing consequences. In particular, in the model of capital accumulation and
resource depletion ﬁrst analyzed by Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Solow (1974) —
which we will henceforth refer to as the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow (DHS) model — the
application of DU forces consumption to approach zero as time goes to inﬁnity, even
though sustainable streams with constant or increasing consumption are feasible.
Moreover, this result holds for any discount factor δ smaller than one; even when
δ is close to one so that discounting is small. In other words, when applied to the
DHS model, the use of DU undermines the livelihood of generations in the far future
also when each generation is given almost the same weight as its predecessor.
This motivates the central question posed in this paper: Does there exist an
alternative criterion of intergenerational justice satisfying the following desiderata:
(1) The criterion incorporates an equity condition respecting the interests of future
generations.
1(2) The criterion resolves intergenerational conﬂicts by leading to consequences
with ethical appeal, in particular when applied to the DHS model, as well as
to the usual one-sector model of economic growth (the Ramsey model).
In our investigation, we adopt a setting that allows for easy comparison with DU,
as axiomatized by Koopmans (1960). In particular, we remain within Koopmans’
(1960) framework, by requiring our criterion (a) to be representable by a numerical
social welfare function (SWF), (b) to satisfy Koopmans’ (1960) stationarity condi-
tion, and (c) to retain some sensitivity to the interest of the present generation.
One way of ensuring that generations are treated in an equal manner is to insist
on the procedural equity condition of Finite Anonymity. Finite Anonymity means
that a ﬁnite permutation of a consumption stream leads to an alternative stream that
is equally good in social evaluation. Finite Anonymity has the interesting property
that — when combined with the Pareto principle in models of economic growth — it
rules out streams that are not non-decreasing, provided that the technology satisﬁes
a productivity condition (see Asheim, Buchholz and Tungodden, 2001). Since a DHS
technology is productive in this sense, Finite Anonymity combined with the Pareto
principle entails that only eﬃcient and non-decreasing streams are acceptable. In
particular, it thus formalizes the ethical intuition that deems as unacceptable the
consequences of discounted utilitarianism in the setting of DHS technologies.
However, as demonstrated by Basu and Mitra (2003), there exists no numerically
representable welfare function which satisﬁes both Finite Anonymity and the Pareto
principle. In fact, Finite Anonymity is hard to combine with any kind of sensitivity
to the interests of each generation, as long as one requires numerical representability
(see Basu and Mitra, 2007).
An alternative is to apply the axiom of Hammond Equity for the Future (HEF),
which is a weak consequentialist equity condition introduced by Asheim and Tun-
godden (2004) and analyzed by Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden (2007, 2008) and
Banerjee (2006). HEF captures the following ethical intuition: A sacriﬁce by the
present generation leading to a uniform gain for all future generations cannot yield
2a consumption stream that is less desirable in social evaluation if the present re-
mains better oﬀ than the future even after the sacriﬁce. Under certain consistency
requirements on the social preferences, HEF is not only weaker than the ordinary
Hammond Equity condition, but it is also implied by other consequentialist equity
conditions like the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and the Lorenz Domination
principle (see Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden, 2007, for details). Hence, it can be
endorsed both from an egalitarian and a utilitarian point of view.
Combined with continuity, HEF entails that social evaluation is sensitive to the
interests of the present generation only when the present is worse oﬀ than the future.
As investigated in our companion paper, Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden (2008), the
axiom can be introduced in the Koopmans framework, in which it can be used to
justify what we there refer to as a sustainable recursive SWF.
The purpose of the current paper is to apply the concept of sustainable recur-
sive SWFs to two important classes of technologies used to model economic growth:
Ramsey technologies and DHS technologies. We thereby demonstrate the applica-
bility of this concept and allow judgements to be made on its consequences in these
models. For reasons of tractability we consider a small modiﬁcation of DU consistent
with the condition of HEF. The resulting criterion — which we refer to as the sus-
tainable discounted utilitarian (SDU) criterion — is within the class of sustainable
recursive SWFs and allows for easy comparison with DU.
In Section 2 we present the formal deﬁnition of an SDU SWF: an SWF is SDU
if it satisﬁes four requirements. While three of these requirements are also satisﬁed
by DU, one departs from DU by requiring that an SDU SWF not be sensitive to
the interests of the present generation if the present is better oﬀ than the future.
This requirement ensures that an SDU SWF satisﬁes HEF. In Section 3 we provide
a convenient suﬃcient condition to identify SDU optimum streams within any given
set of feasible streams. In Section 4 we consider the class of Ramsey technologies and
characterize the set of SDU optimum streams in this environment through Theorem
1. Likewise, in Section 5 we apply results from earlier work (Dasgupta and Mitra,
31983; Asheim, 1988) and characterize the set of SDU optimum streams in the class
of DHS technologies through Theorem 2. In Section 6 we discuss how SDU resolves
distributional conﬂicts between generations; in particular, in DHS technologies the
use of SDU leads to development at ﬁrst when capital is productive, while protecting
the generations in the distant future from the grave consequences of discounting
when the vanishing resource stock undermines capital productivity. In an appendix
we establish that an SDU SWF always exists and is unique within the subset of
bounded streams. Moreover, we show that any SDU SWF is a sustainable recursive
SWF by verifying that all the axioms characterizing the latter concept are satisﬁed.
2 Sustainable discounted utilitarian SWFs
Denote by R+ the set of all non-negative real numbers, by R++ the set of all positive
real numbers, by Z+ the set of all non-negative integers, and by N the set of all
positive integers. Denote by 0x = (x0,x1,...,xt,...) ∈ R
Z+
+ an inﬁnite stream of
consumption where, for t ∈ Z+, xt is a non-negative indicator of the well-being of
generation t. Deﬁne, for T ∈ N, 0xT−1 = (x0,...,xT−1) and Tx = (xT,xT+1,...);
these are, respectively, the T-head and the T-tail of 0x. A consumption stream 0x
is called egalitarian if xt = xt+1 for all t ∈ Z+.
Utility in a period is derived from consumption in that period alone. The utility
function U : R+ → R is assumed to satisfy:
U is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuous on R+ (U.1)
U is continuously diﬀerentiable on R++, and U0(x) → ∞ as x → 0. (U.2)














+ | 0x is bounded
o
.
Note that, if 0 < δ0 < δ00 < 1, then Xδ0 ) Xδ00 )
T
δ∈(0,1)Xδ ) Xϕ.
4Given any δ ∈ (0,1), the SWF w : Xδ → R deﬁned by
w(0x) := (1 − δ)
X∞
t=0δtU(xt)
is the discounted utilitarian (DU) SWF. It follows from (U.1) that w is well-deﬁned.
Multiplying the sum of discounted utilities by 1 − δ ensures that w(0x) = U(x0) if
0x is egalitarian.
The sustainable discounted utilitarian (SDU) SWF modiﬁes DU in the following





(1 − δ)U(x0) + δW(1x) if U(x0) ≤ W(1x)
W(1x) if U(x0) > W(1x),
(W.1)
W(0x) = U(x0) if 0x is egalitarian, (W.2)
W(0x0) ≥ W(0x00) if 0x0 ≥ 0x00 , (W.3)
limT→∞δTW(Tx) = 0. (W.4)
Requirement (W.1) departs from DU by requiring that an SDU SWF not be sensitive
to the interests of the present generation if the present is better oﬀ than the future.
In constrast, the other three requirements deﬁning an SDU SWF, (W.2)–(W.4), are
also satisﬁed by DU. They are restrictions which are independent of (W.1).
Consider the following algorithmic construction. For any stream 0x ∈ Xδ and
each T ∈ N, construct the ﬁnite sequence:
z(T,T) = w(Tx)
z(T − 1,T) = min{(1 − δ)U(xT−1) + δz(T,T),z(T,T)}
···
z(0,T) = min{(1 − δ)U(x0) + δz(1,T),z(1,T)}.

      
      
(1)
Deﬁne the mapping W : Xδ → R by
W(0x) := limT→∞z(0,T). (W)
In the appendix of this paper we show existence of an SDU SWF by establishing
that W is well-deﬁned by (W) and satisﬁes (W.1)–(W.4). Moreover, we show that,
5if W is an SDU SWF, then W(0x) ≤ W(0x) for 0x ∈ Xδ and W(0x) = W(0x) for
0x ∈ Xϕ. Hence, W yields an upper bound on SDU welfare for all consumption
streams and is the unique SDU SWF restricted to bounded streams.
In the appendix we also establish that any SDU SWF is a sustainable recur-
sive SWF; cf. Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden (2008) who deﬁne and provide an
axiomatization of this class of SWFs.
The following result provides a basic relationship between SDU and DU SWFs.
Proposition 1 Assume that W is an SDU SWF.
(i) If 0x ∈ Xδ, then, for all t ∈ Z+, W(0x) ≤ W(tx) ≤ w(tx)
(ii) If 0x ∈ Xϕ is a non-decreasing stream, then W(0x) = w(0x).
Proof. Part (i). It follows from (W.1) that, for all t ∈ Z+,
W(tx) = min{(1 − δ)U(xt) + δW(t+1x), W(t+1x)} ≤ W(t+1x).
Hence, W(0x) ≤ W(tx).
By Lemma 9 of the appendix, for all t ∈ Z+, W(tx) ≤ w(tx).
Part (ii). This result follows from the deﬁnitions of W and w, using Proposition
7 of the appendix, which shows that W(0x) = W(0x) for all 0x ∈ Xϕ.
3 Sustainable discounted utilitarian optimum
We now introduce the notions of feasibility and optimum in our study. Let X ⊂ Xδ
denote the set of feasible consumption streams; it will be assumed to be non-empty
and convex. This set will be determined by the technology available over time
to transform inputs into outputs, and on the initial stocks of the various inputs
available to an economy. In the next two sections, we will see how the set of feasible
consumption streams is obtained, starting with the more primitive information of
technology and available resources.
6Given a discount factor δ and utility function U satisfying (U.1) and (U.2), a
consumption stream 0¯ x ∈ X will be called SDU optimum if, for some W : Xδ → R
satisfying (W.1)–(W.4):
W(0x) ≤ W(0¯ x) for all 0x ∈ X.
This deﬁnition entails that 0¯ x ∈ X is a unique SDU optimum if, for every W : Xδ →
R satisfying (W.1)–(W.4):
W(0x) < W(0¯ x) for all 0x ∈ X, 0x 6= 0¯ x.
Similarly, a consumption stream 0x0 ∈ X will be called DU optimum if:
w(0x) ≤ w(0x0) for all 0x ∈ X.
We now provide a convenient suﬃcient condition for an egalitarian consumption
stream to be the unique SDU optimum.
Proposition 2 Let 0xe  0 be an egalitarian consumption stream in X. Assume
that there exists a price sequence 0p = (p0,p1,p2,...)  0 satisfying







for every consumption stream 0x ∈ X. Then 0xe is the unique SDU optimum.
Proof. Suppose that 0x is a feasible consumption stream, distinct from 0xe,
with W(0x) ≥ W(0xe) for some W : Xδ → R satisfying (W.1)–(W.4). Then, by
(W.3) and Proposition 1,
w(txe) = w(0xe) = U(xe
0) = W(0xe) ≤ W(0x) ≤ W(tx) ≤ w(tx). (4)





where the inﬁnite sum in (5) is absolutely convergent and therefore convergent, given
that 0x ∈ X ⊆ Xδ. Thus, At ∈ R for t ≥ 0.







with strict inequality in (6) if xτ 6= xe
τ. Also, for t ≥ 0,









Combining (5), (6) and (7), we have




for t ≥ 0, with strict inequality in (8) for t = 0. Combining (4) and (5), we have
A0 > 0 and At ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 1. (9)
For t ≥ 0, write




Note that, by (4) and (10), At − At+1 = at for all t ≥ 0, and, by (2),













for all t ≥ 0. Then, for all T ≥ 0, we have (using Abel’s partial summation method)
XT
t=0atbt = (A0 − A1)b0 + ··· + (AT − AT+1)bT
= A0b0 + A1(b1 − b0) + ··· + AT(bT − bT−1) − AT+1bT
≥ A0b0 − AT+1bT ,
(12)
























T+1 > 0 and pτ/pT ≥ δτ−T for all τ > T. By (3), limT→∞
P∞
τ=T+1pτxτ
= 0. Using this fact in (13), we obtain
limT→∞AT+1bT = 0. (14)
8It follows from (9) and (14) that, for any ε ∈ (0,A0b0), there exists ˜ T such that, for





t=0atbt ≥ A0b0 − AT+1bT ≥ ε > 0.
This contradicts (3) and shows that there is no feasible stream 0x, distinct from 0xe,
with W(0x) ≥ W(0xe).
4 Ramsey technologies
A Ramsey technology (following Ramsey, 1928) is determined by a sequence of pro-
duction functions 0g = (g0,g1,g2,...) where, for each t, gt : R+ → R+ satisﬁes
gt is concave, continuous and increasing on R+ , (g.1)
gt is continuously diﬀerentiable on R++ , (g.2)
gt(0) = 0, g0
t > 0 on R++ . (g.3)
For each t, the gross output function ft is deﬁned by ft(k) = gt(k)+k for all k ≥ 0.
Let y denote gross output, which is split into consumption x and capital input k.
A program (ty, tk) is yt–feasible if there exist tk and t+1y satisfying
0 ≤ kτ ≤ yτ and 0 ≤ yτ+1 ≤ fτ(kτ) for all τ ≥ t.
The consumption tx associated with a yt–feasible program (ty, tk) is deﬁned by
xτ = yτ − kτ for all τ ≥ t. A yt–feasible program (ty, tk) is called egalitarian if
the consumption stream tx associated with it is egalitarian. A yt–feasible program
(t¯ y, t¯ k) is yt-eﬃcient if there is no yt–feasible program (ty, tk) satisfying xτ ≥ ¯ xτ
for all τ ≥ t, with strict inequality for some τ ≥ t.
The set X ⊂ R
Z+
+ of feasible consumption streams, introduced in the previous
section, can be described for Ramsey technologies by:
X = {0x ∈ R
Z+
+ | 0xis a consumption stream associated
with a y0–feasible program (0y, 0k)}.
9Combined with the results of Cass and Yaari (1971), Proposition 2 implies the
following suﬃcient condition for a unique SDU optimum.
Proposition 3 Consider a Ramsey technology satisfying (g.1)–(g.3) and X ⊆ Xδ.
Assume that the y0–feasible program (0ye, 0ke) is egalitarian and y0–eﬃcient with
(0ye, 0ke)  0, and satisﬁes:
δf0
t(ke













Then (0ye, 0ke) is the unique SDU optimum.
Proof. Since 0ke  0, the price sequence 0p  0 determined by
p0 = 1 and pt+1f0
t(ke
t) = pt for all t ≥ 0 (17)




< ∞, and so (3) follows from the Corollary of Cass and Yaari (1971, p. 338). Hence,
Proposition 3 follows from Proposition 2.
We now specialize our discussion to the case in which the production functions for
the various time periods are the same, and the net capital productivity approaches
zero as the capital stock approaches inﬁnity. This is expressed formally in
gt = g for all t ≥ 0, (g.4)
limk→∞g0(k) = 0. (g.5)
Write the gross output function as f(k) = g(k) + k.
It follows from (g.1)–(g.5) that, for every y > 0, there exists a unique x(y),
satisfying 0 < x(y) < y, which solves y = f(y − x(y)); deﬁne x(0) = 0. For each
y, x(y) represents the consumption level which keeps the output level y intact over
time. Clearly, x : R+ → R+ is continuous for x ≥ 0, and diﬀerentiable with
x0(y) =
f0(y − x(y)) − 1
f0(y − x(y))
> 0.





Then δ : R++ → (0,1) is continuous and non-decreasing in y with limy→∞δ(y) = 1
by (g.5). Deﬁne δ(0) := limy↓0δ(y).
Finally, we can deﬁne y∞(δ), for all δ ∈ (0,1), by
y∞(δ) := min{y ≥ 0 | δ(y) ≥ δ}.
Then y∞ : (0,1) → R+ is strictly increasing on [δ(0),1].
Theorem 1 Consider a Ramsey technology satisfying (g.1)–(g.5). For any δ ∈
(0,1) and y0 > 0, there exists a unique SDU optimum 0x∗.
(i) If y0 ≥ y∞(δ), then 0x∗ is eﬃcient and egalitarian with x∗
t = x(y0) for all
t ≥ 0.
(ii) If y0 < y∞(δ), then 0x∗ is eﬃcient and strictly increasing, maximizing w(0x)
over all y0-feasible consumption streams and converging to x(y∞(δ)).
For the proof of Theorem 1 we must show that, for any δ ∈ (0,1), the set of
y0–feasible consumption streams, X, is included in Xδ.
Lemma 1 Let y0 > 0 be given. For all δ ∈ (0,1), X ⊆ Xδ.
Proof. Let y0 > 0 and δ ∈ (0,1) be given, implying that (1 + δ)/2δ > 1. While
f(k)/k > 1 for all k > 0, we have limk→∞[f(k)/k] = 1. Thus, there is K > y0 such
that f(k)/k ≤ (1 + δ)/2δ for all k ≥ K. This implies that, for all k ≥ K, we have
δf(k)/k ≤ (1 + δ)/2 ≡ µ < 1.
Deﬁne k0 = K, and kt+1 = f(kt) for t ≥ 0, at = f(kt)/kt for t ≥ 0, and
πt =
Qt
s=0 as for t ≥ 0. Then, for every y0-feasible stream, we have xt+1 ≤ yt+1 ≤
f(yt − xt) ≤ f(yt) ≤ f(kt) = a(t)k(t) = π(t)K, and so:
δt+1xt+1 ≤ δt+1πtK ≤ µt+1K for all t ≥ 0.
11Hence, for every y0-feasible stream,
P∞
t=0 δtxt ≤ K/(1 − µ) < ∞.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix δ ∈ (0,1) and y0 > 0.
Case (i): y0 ≥ y∞(δ). By the deﬁnition of y∞(δ) it follows that δ(y0) ≥ δ.
Consider the y0–feasible stream 0x∗ deﬁned by x∗
t = x(y0) for all t ≥ 0, with
associated y0–feasible program (0ye, 0ke) satisfying, for all t ≥ 0, ye
t = y0 and
ke
t = y0 − x(y0). Then, (0ye, 0ke) is clearly egalitarian.
Since y0 > 0, we have f(y0 − x(y0)) = y0 > 0, and so (y0 − x(y0)) > 0. Thus,
θ := g0((y0 − x(y0)) is well-deﬁned and positive. Hence,
f0(ke
t) = f0(y0 − x(y0)) = 1 + θ > 1
for all t, so that (16) is satisﬁed. Further, the price sequence 0p  0 determined
by (17), is well-deﬁned, and limt→∞ ptke
t = 0. Thus, by the Theorem of Cass and
Yaari (1971, p. 337), (0ye, 0ke) is eﬃcient. By the deﬁnition of the function δ,
f0(ke






for all t, so that (15) is also satisﬁed. It follows now from Proposition 3 and Lemma
1 that 0x∗ is the unique SDU optimum.
Case (ii): y0 < y∞(δ). By the deﬁnition of y∞(δ) it follows that δ(y0) < δ. It is
well-known (see Beals and Koopmans, 1969) that there exists y0–feasible program
(0y∗, 0k∗) satisfying
limt→∞y∗
t = y∞(δ) and limt→∞k∗
t = y∞(δ) − x(y∞(δ)),
which is eﬃcient, and which has associated with it a y0–feasible stream 0x∗ ∈ Xϕ.
Furthermore, 0x∗ is strictly increasing and uniquely maximizes w(0x) over all y0–
feasible programs (0y, 0k) with associated y0–feasible stream 0x. Hence, if 0x is a
y0–feasible stream distinct from 0x∗ and W : Xδ → R satisﬁes (W.1)–(W.4), then
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 imply
W(0x∗) = w(0x∗) > w(0x) ≥ W(0x),
thereby establishing that 0x∗ is the unique SDU optimum.
12Theorem 1 means that the unique SDU optimal stream coincides the DU op-
timum stream with increasing consumption if there is a small initial capital stock
(so that net capital productivity is high), while it coincides with the egalitarian and
eﬃcient stream with a large initial capital stock.
5 Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technologies
A Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technology (DHS) (see Dasgupta and Heal, 1974, 1979;
Solow, 1974) is determined by a stationary production function G : R3
+ → R that
satisﬁes
G is concave, non-decreasing, homogeneous of
degree one, and continuous for (k,r,`) ∈ R3
+ ,
(G.1)
G is twice continuously diﬀerentiable
and satisﬁes (Gk,Gr,G`)  0 for (k,r,`) ∈ R3
++ .
(G.2)
G(k,0,`) = 0 = G(0,r,`) (G.3)
Given any (k0,r0)  0, there is η0 > 0 such that for all (k,r)
satisfying k ≥ k0,0 < r ≤ r0, [rGr(k,r,1)]/G`(k,r,1) ≥ η0 .
(G.4)
(G.3) states that both capital input k and resource use r are essential in production.
(G.4) requires that the ratio of the share of the resource in net output to the share
of labor in net output is bounded away from zero (when labor is ﬁxed at unit level).
The labor force is assumed to be stationary and normalized to 1. The gross
output function F, is deﬁned by F(k,r) = G(k,r,1) + k for all (k,r) ≥ 0, and is
assumed to satisfy
F is strictly concave in (k,r) on R2
+ (F.1)
Fkr ≥ 0 for (k,r) ∈ R2
++ , (F.2)
where (F.2) is used to ensure (19) of Lemma 3 below.
13Let y denote gross output and m the total resource stock. The production
possibilities are described by the stationary transformation set T given by
T = {[(k,m),(y,m0)] | 0 ≤ y ≤ F(k,r); 0 ≤ r = m − m0 ≤ m}.
A program (ty, tm, tk) is (yt,mt)–feasible if there exist tk, t+1y and t+1m satisfying
0 ≤ kτ ≤ yτ and [(kτ,mτ),(yτ+1,mτ+1)] ∈ T for all τ ≥ t,
The consumption tx associated with a (yt,mt)–feasible program (ty, tm, tk) is de-
ﬁned by xτ = yτ − kτ for all τ ≥ t. A (yt,mt)–feasible program (ty, tm, tk) is
called egalitarian if the consumption stream tx associated with it is egalitarian.
A (yt,mt)–feasible program (t¯ y, t ¯ m, t¯ k) is (yt,mt)-eﬃcient if there is no (yt,mt)–
feasible program (ty, tm, tk) satisfying xτ ≥ ¯ xτ for all τ ≥ t, with strict inequality
for some τ ≥ t.
The set X ⊂ R
Z+
+ of feasible consumption streams, introduced in Section 3, can
be described for DHS technologies by:
X = {0x ∈ R
Z+
+ | 0xis a consumption stream associated
with a (y0,m0)–feasible program (0y, 0m, 0k)}.
Lemma 2 Let (y0,m0)  0 be given. For all δ ∈ (0,1), X ⊆ Xδ.
Proof. Let (y0,m0) >> 0 and δ ∈ (0,1) be given. Deﬁne f(k) = F(k,m0,1)+k
for k ≥ 0. Then f(k)/k > 1 for all k > 0, while we have limk→∞[f(k)/k] = 1.
Therefore, the argument given in the proof of Lemma 1 applies here as well.
Assumptions (G.1)–(G.4) and (F.1)–(F.2) do not ensure the existence of an egal-
itarian stream with positive consumption. We concentrate on those technologies
satisfying (G.1)–(G.4) and (F.1)–(F.2) which do. That is, we assume:
There exists from any (y,m)  0
an egalitarian positive consumption stream.
(E)
Cass and Mitra (1991) give a necessary and suﬃcient condition on F for (E) to hold.
14Lemma 3 Consider a DHS technology satisfying (G.1)–(G.4), (F.1)–(F.2) and (E).
For any (y0,m0)  0, there exists a unique (y0,m0)–feasible program (0ye, 0me, 0ke)
such that the associated (y0,m0)–feasible stream 0xe  0 is eﬃcient and egalitarian.
Furthermore, the price sequence 0p  0 determined by
p0 = 1 and pt+1Fk(ke
t,me
t − me
















holds for every (y0,m0)–feasible stream 0x.
Proof. The existence of an eﬃcient and egalitarian (y0,m0)–feasible program
(0ye, 0me, 0ke), such that the associated (y0,m0)–feasible consumption stream 0xe
 0, follows from Dasgupta and Mitra (1983, Proposition 5); uniqueness follows
from (F.1). Property (19) of the price sequence 0p follows from Asheim (1988,
Lemma 3 and Proposition 1). Property (20) of maximization of the present value
of the consumption stream at 0xe follows from Dasgupta and Mitra (1983, Theorem
1).
For each (y0,m0)  0, consider the unique (y0,m0)–feasible program (0ye, 0me,
0ke), guaranteed by Lemma 3, such that the associated (y0,m0)-feasible consump-
tion stream 0xe  0 is eﬃcient and egalitarian. Furthermore, let 0p  0 be the
associated price sequence determined by (18). By (20), we have
P∞
t=0pt < ∞. For












For each (y0,m0)  0, we refer to δ0(y0,m0) as the short-run discount factor and
to δ∞(y0,m0) as the long-run discount factor at time 0 supporting the eﬃcient and
egalitarian (y0,m0)–feasible program (0ye, 0me, 0ke).
15When the short-run discount factor is at least as large as δ, the eﬃcient egali-
tarian program described in Lemma 3 is the unique SDU optimum, as the following
proposition shows.
Proposition 4 Consider a DHS technology satisfying (G.1)–(G.4), (F.1)–(F.2) and
(E). If (y0, m0)  0 satisﬁes δ0(y0,m0) ≥ δ, then the eﬃcient and egalitarian
(y0,m0)-feasible stream 0xe  0 is the unique SDU optimum.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3 that 0p  0, the price sequence determined by
(18) and supporting the unique (y0,m0)–feasible program (0ye, 0me, 0ke), satisﬁes
(2) and (3). Hence, by Proposition 2, 0xe is the unique SDU optimum.
When the short-run discount factor is smaller than δ, the description of an SDU
optimum is more involved. To carry out the analysis, we have to compare the long-
run discount factor with δ. For this purpose, a preliminary result comparing the
short-run and the long-run discount factors is useful.
Lemma 4 Consider a DHS technology satisfying (G.1)–(G.4), (F.1)–(F.2) and (E).
For all (y0,m0)  0, δ0(y0,m0) < δ∞(y0,m0).
Proof. The price sequence 0p  0, determined by (18), and supporting the
unique (y0,m0)–feasible program (0ye, 0me, 0ke) obtained in Lemma 3, satisﬁes
(19). Denote (p1/p0) by ρ. Then, by using (19), we have θ > 0, such that (pt+1/pt) >
ρ + θ for all t ≥ 1. Let T ≥ 2 be given. Then, for t ∈ {1,...,T}, we have
pt+1 > ρpt + θpt . (21)
Adding up the inequalities in (21) from t = 1 to t = T, we get:
p2 + p3 + ··· + pT+1 > ρ(p1 + p2 + ··· + pT) + θp1 . (22)
Adding the trivial equality p1 = ρp0 to (22), we obtain:
p1 + p2 + p3 + ··· + pT+1 > ρ(p0 + p1 + p2 + ··· + pT) + θp1 .
16This yields

p1 + p2 + p3 + ··· + pT+1















t=0 pt. Letting T → ∞ in (23), we get:





> ρ = δ0(y0,m0),
which is the desired result.
To proceed further, we note that even when the short-run discount factor is
initially smaller than δ for a (y0,m0)–feasible program, the short-run discount factor
becomes at least as large as δ after a ﬁnite time period, provided the consumption
stream on such a program is bounded away from zero.
Lemma 5 Consider a DHS technology satisfying (G.1)–(G.4), (F.1)–(F.2) and (E).
Let (y0,m0)  0 and δ ∈ (0,1). If a (y0,m0)–feasible program (0y, 0m, 0k) has an
associated (y0,m0)-feasible stream 0x  0 with liminfT→∞w(Tx) > U(0), then there
exists τ ≥ 0 such that δ ≤ δ0(yτ,mτ).
Proof. Assume that (0y, 0m, 0k) is a (y0,m0)–feasible program where the
associated (y0,m0)-feasible stream 0x  0 satisﬁes liminfT→∞w(Tx) > U(0). By
(G.1) and (G.3), there exists ˜ k ≥ 1 satisfying F(1,m0/˜ k) ≤ 1/δ. Note that kT → ∞
as T → ∞ and mt > 0 for all t ≥ 0 (since otherwise liminfT→∞ w(Tx) = U(0),
contradicting the hypothesis of the lemma). Choose a time τ such that kτ ≥ ˜ k ≥
1. Consider the eﬃcient and egalitarian (yτ,mτ)–feasible program (τye, τme, τke),










= Fk(kτ,mτ − me
τ+1) ≤ F(kτ,mτ − me
τ+1)/kτ
≤ F(1,(mτ − me




thereby establishing that there is a ﬁnite time τ such that δ0(yτ,mτ) ≥ δ.
It follows from Proposition 1 that SDU welfare is non-decreasing: W(tx) ≤
W(t+1x) for all t ∈ Z+. Still, xt may contribute to W(tx) even if xt > xt+1, provided
17that U(xt+1) < W(t+2x). Indeed, it is straightforward to show that streams that are
not non-decreasing can be SDU optimum in non-stationary technologies. However,
SDU optimum streams in DHS technologies (as in Ramsey technologies) will in
fact be streams maximizing w(0x) subject to the constraint that xt ≤ xt+1 for all
t ∈ Z+. Such streams have been analyzed in discrete time by Asheim (1988) and in
continuous time by Pezzey (1994). This motivates the following lemma.
Lemma 6 Consider a DHS technology satisfying (G.1)–(G.4), (F.1)–(F.2) and (E).
For any (y0,m0)  0, there exists a (y0,m0)–feasible program (0y∗, 0m∗, 0k∗) with
the property that the associated (y0,m0)–feasible stream 0x∗  0 maximizes w(0x)
over all (y0,m0)–feasible and non-decreasing consumption streams 0x. Furthermore,
(i) (0y∗, m∗, 0k∗) is unique and time-consistent (for all t ≥ 0, tx∗ maximizes
w(tx) over all (y∗
t,m∗
t)–feasible and non-decreasing consumption streams tx),
(ii) 0x∗ ∈ Xϕ; in particular, there is a τ ≥ 0 such that
x∗
0 < ··· < x∗
τ−1 < x∗
τ = x∗
τ+1 = ··· ,
where τ > 0 if δ∞(y0,m0) < δ, and τ = 0 if δ∞(y0,m0) ≥ δ.
(iii) There is a µ such that if 0x is an arbitrary (y0,m0)-feasible stream, with 1x
non-decreasing, then
δ · [w(1x) − w(1x∗)] ≤ µ · [U(x∗
0) − U(x0)] (24)
where µ = 1 if δ∞(y0,m0) < δ and 0 < µ ≤ 1 if δ∞(y0,m0) ≥ δ, and where
(24) is strict if the associated (y0,m0)–feasible program (0y, 0m, 0k) is distinct
from (0y∗, 0m∗, 0k∗).
Proof. Existence follows from Asheim (1988, Proposition 2, suﬃciency part).
Parts (i) and (ii) follow from Asheim (1988, Lemma 4 (a) and (c)). That 0x∗ is
egalitarian if δ∞(y0,m0) ≥ δ follows from Asheim (1988, Lemma 4 (b)). The proof
of Asheim (1988, Lemma 4) implies the two-phase structure of 0x∗, stated in part
(ii). Finally, Lemma 5 of this paper establishes that τ of part (ii) is ﬁnite.
18Lemma 6 entails that there exist unique policy functions k∗ and m∗ such that,
for all (y0,m0)  0, k∗
0 = k∗(y0,m0), m∗
1 = m∗(y0,m0) and y∗
1 = F(k∗(y0,m0),m0−
m∗(y0,m0)), where (0y∗, 0m∗, 0k∗) is the unique (y0,m0)–feasible program with the
property that the associated (y0,m0)–feasible stream 0x∗  0 maximizes w(0x) over
all (y0,m0)–feasible and non-decreasing consumption streams 0x.
Theorem 2 Consider a DHS technology satisfying (G.1)–(G.4), (F.1)–(F.2) and
(E). For any δ ∈ (0,1) and (y0,m0)  0, let 0x∗  0 denote the eﬃcient (y0,m0)-
feasible stream maximizing w(0x) over all (y0,m0)-feasible and non-decreasing con-
sumption streams 0x. Then 0x∗ is the unique SDU optimum. The stream has an
eventual egalitarian phase, preceded by a phase with increasing consumption if and
only if δ∞(y0,m0) < δ.
Proof. Suppose that 0x is a (y0,m0)–feasible stream distinct from 0x∗ such that
W(0x) ≥ W(0x∗) for some W : Xδ → R satisfying (W.1)–(W.4). Let (0y, 0m, 0k)
be the (y0,m0)–feasible program associated with 0x. Since, by Propositions 8 and
1(ii) (recalling that 0x∗ ∈ Xϕ is non-decreasing),
W(0x) ≥ W(0x) ≥ W(0x∗) = w(0x∗) > U(0),
it follows from (W) that liminfT→∞w(Tx) > U(0). Hence, by Lemma 5, there exists
˜ τ ≥ 0 such that δ0(y˜ τ,m˜ τ) ≥ δ. By Proposition 4 and (W.1), we may assume, with-
out loss of generality, that (˜ τy, ˜ τm, ˜ τk) = (˜ τye, ˜ τme, ˜ τke), where (˜ τye, ˜ τme, ˜ τke)
is the unique eﬃcient and egalitarian (y˜ τ,m˜ τ)–feasible program. By Lemmas 4
and 6(i)&(ii), kt = k∗(yt,mt), mt+1 = m∗(yt,mt) and yt+1 = F(k∗(yt,mt),mt −
m∗(yt,mt)) for all t ≥ ˜ τ. Since 0x is distinct from 0x∗, we may deﬁne τ ≥ 0 by
τ := max{t ≥ 0 | kt 6= k∗(yt,mt) or mt+1 6= m∗(yt,mt)
or yt+1 6= F(k∗(yt,mt),mt − m∗(yt,mt))}.
Let (τy∗, τm∗, τk∗) be the unique (yτ,mτ)–feasible program with the property
that the associated (yτ,mτ)–feasible stream τx∗  0 maximizes w(τx0) over all
19(yτ,mτ)–feasible and non-decreasing consumption streams τx0. By the deﬁnition of
τ, (τy, τm, τk) is distinct from (τy∗, τm∗, τk∗) with τ+1x being non-decreasing.
By (W.1), we may assume, without loss of generality, that W(τx) ≥ W(τx∗) ≥ 0.
By Lemma 6(iii),
W(τx) − W(τx∗) ≤ w(τx) − w(τx∗) < (1 − µ) · [U(xτ) − U(x∗
τ)], (25)
where µ = 1 if δ∞(yτ,mτ) < δ and 0 < µ ≤ 1 if δ∞(yτ,mτ) ≥ δ, since W(τx) ≤
w(τx) by Proposition 1(i) and W(τx∗) = w(τx∗) by Proposition 1(ii), keeping in
mind that τx∗ ∈ Xϕ is non-decreasing.
Case 1: δ∞(yτ,mτ) < δ. Then, by Lemma 6(iii), µ = 1, implying by (25) that,
W(τx) − W(τx∗) < 0. This contradicts W(τx) ≥ W(τx∗).
Case 2: δ∞(yτ,mτ) ≥ δ. By Lemma 6(ii), τx∗ is egalitarian, implying that
W(τx∗) = w(τx∗) = w(τ+1x∗). Furthermore, it follows from Proposition 1(i) that
W(τx) ≤ W(τ+1x) ≤ w(τ+1x∗). Hence, by Lemma 6(iii),





where 0 < µ ≤ 1. If µ = 1, then (25) contradicts W(τx) ≥ W(τx∗). If 0 < µ < 1,
then (25) and (26) are incompatible.
In either case, we contradict that there exists a (y0,m0)–feasible stream 0x dis-
tinct from 0x∗ such that W(0x) ≥ W(0x∗) ≥ 0.
It follows from Lemma 6(ii) that 0x∗ has an eventual egalitarian phase, preceded
by a phase with increasing consumption if and only if δ∞(y0,m0) < δ.
6 Concluding remarks
The DHS model of capital accumulation and resource depletion gives rise to inter-
esting distributional conﬂicts. On the one hand, when applied to DHS technologies
DU undermines the interests of the generations in the far future by forcing con-
sumption to approach zero as time goes to inﬁnity. On the other hand, criteria
like classical utilitarianism and leximin that treat generations equally by satisfying
20Finite Anonymity, and thus are not numerically representable, lead to consequences
that may not be compelling: classical utilitarianism leads to unbounded inequality
by giving rise to unlimited growth, while leximin does not allow for any trade-oﬀ
between the interests of diﬀerent generations, meaning that poverty may be perpet-
uated if the economy has a small initial endowment of stocks (cf. Solow, 1974).
In this paper we have applied sustainable discounted utilitarianism (SDU) to
DHS technologies and showed that the application of this criterion resolves in an
appealing way the distributional conﬂicts that arise in this class of technologies:
(1) It allows for growth and development initially when the economy is highly
productive.
(2) It leads to an eﬃcient and egalitarian stream eventually when resource deple-
tion and capital accumulation have reduced net capital productivity. By thus
preventing consumption to approach zero, it respects the interests of future
generations. By not yielding unlimited growth, it ensures bounded inequality.
We have also applied SDU to the usual one-sector model of economic growth
(Ramsey technologies). If, in this setting, there is a small initial capital stock (so
that net capital productivity is high), then the criterion leads to the DU optimum
stream with increasing consumption. With a large initial capital stock, however, the
criterion gives rise to an eﬃcient and egalitarian stream.
SDU trades oﬀ present and future consumption if and only if the present is
worse oﬀ than the future, while it gives priority to the interests of future generations
otherwise. In the two classes of technologies considered, this property of SDU entails
that the criterion allows for economic development when productivity is high without
leading to inequitable outcomes. A dilemma posed by Epstein (1986) (that an
economy has to choose between development and equity; it cannot have both) is
thereby apparently resolved. Moreover, in both classes of technologies, we obtain
intergenerational streams in congruence with a view expressed by Dasgupta and
Heal (1979, p. 311) and Rawls (1999, pp. 251–255) (see also Gaspart and Gosseries,
212007) that trading present consumption for future consumption is more appropriate
for poorer societies, while equality considerations should dominate for richer ones.
The axiomatic underpinnings of SDU is not the main focus of this paper, even
though, in the appendix, we show that SDU satisﬁes all the axioms characterizing
sustainable recursive SWFs, a concept analyzed in our companion paper (Asheim,
Mitra and Tungodden, 2008). Rather, the investigation of this paper seeks to demon-
strate convincingly that SDU is an applicable criterion yielding consequences that
might appeal to our ethical intuition.
A Appendix
A.1 Existence of a Sustainable Discounted Utilitarian SWF
We are given δ ∈ (0,1) and U : R+ → R satisfying (U.1). We want to establish existence
of a function W : Xδ → R satisfying (W.1)–(W.4). To this end, we ﬁrst establish a basic
monotonicity property, and then use that with a backward iteration device to deﬁne a
function W with these properties.
Write Z := [U(0),∞). For (a,b) ∈ Z × Z, deﬁne:
f(a,b) = min{(1 − δ)a + δb, b}. (f)
Note that f is a well-deﬁned function from Z2 to Z, and furthermore:
f(a,b) ≤ (1 − δ)a + δb and f(a,b) ≤ b for all (a,b) ∈ Z2 . (A1)
Lemma 7 Suppose (a,b) ∈ Z2 and (a0,b0) ∈ Z2, with (a0,b0) ≤ (a,b). Then
f(a0,b0) ≤ f(a,b). (A2)
Further, if b0 < b, then
f(a0,b0) < f(a,b). (A20)
Proof. We split the proof into two cases: (i) a = a0; (ii) a < a0.
In case (i), since (A2) is clearly true when b0 = b, we need to consider only the case where
b0 < b. In this case, we will establish that (A20) holds, which will establish both statements
22in the Lemma. Suppose, contrary to (A20), that c0 := f(a,b0) ≥ f(a,b) =: c. Then, using
(A1), we have
c ≤ c0 ≤ b0 < b. (A3)
Since c < b, we can infer from (f) that:
c = (1 − δ)a + δb (A4)
and that a < b. Then, using (A3) and (A4), we have:
c0 ≥ c = (1 − δ)a + δb > (1 − δ)a + δb0 (A5)
Thus, by (f), we must have:
c0 = b0 and a > b0 (A6)
Using (A5) and (A6), we then get:
c0 > (1 − δ)a + δb0 > b0 ,
which contradicts (A1). Thus, c0 < c must hold, establishing the Lemma.
In case (ii), there are two possibilities: (a) b = b0; (b) b < b0. In case (a), suppose,
contrary to (A2), that c0 := f(a0,b0) > f(a,b) =: c. Then, using (A1), we have:
c < c0 ≤ b0 = b (A7)
Since c < b, we can infer from (f) that:
c = (1 − δ)a + δb (A8)
and that a < b. Then, using (A7) and (A8), we have:
c0 > c = (1 − δ)a + δb > (1 − δ)a0 + δb0 (A9)
Thus, by (f), we must have:
c0 = b0 and a0 > b0 (A10)
Using (A9) and (A10), we then get:
c0 > (1 − δ)a0 + δb0 > b0
which contradicts (A1). Thus, c0 ≤ c must hold, establishing (A2) in this case.
In case (ii)(b), it follows from cases (ii)(a) and (i) that f(a,b) ≤ f(a0,b) < f(a0,b0),
establishing both statements of the Lemma.
23Let 0x ∈ Xδ be given. For each T ∈ N, deﬁne the ﬁnite sequence {z(0,T),..., z(T −
1,T),z(T,T)} by (1). Notice that this sequence is well-deﬁned since (1−δ)
P∞
τ=Tδτ−TU(xτ)
∈ Z, keeping in mind that U satisﬁes (U.1). At each stage of the backward iteration (that
is for t = T − 1,T − 2,...,0) we have z(t,T) ∈ Z by (f), since U(xt) ∈ Z for all t ∈ Z+.
Using Lemma 7, we can now compare z(0,T) with z(0,T + 1), for each T ∈ N.
Lemma 8 For each T ∈ N, we have:
z(t,T) ≥ z(t,T + 1) for all t ∈ {0,...,T − 1}. (A11)
Proof. Given T ∈ N, we have, from (A1) and (1),










Thus, applying Lemma 7, we have:
z(T − 1,T + 1) = f(U(xT−1),z(T,T + 1)) ≤ f(U(xT−1),z(T,T)) = z(T − 1,T).
Using Lemma 7 repeatedly, we then obtain:
z(t,T + 1) ≤ z(t,T) for all t ∈ {0,...,T − 1}
which establishes (A11).
With these results, we can show that W : Xδ → R deﬁned by (W) is a well-deﬁned SDU
SWF, thereby establishing existence.
Proposition 5 The mapping W : Xδ → R deﬁned by (W) is well-deﬁned and satisﬁes
(W.1)–(W.4).
Proof. By Lemma 8, we have {z(0,T)} monotonically non-increasing in T ∈ N, and it
is bounded below by U(0), so it converges. Thus, W is well-deﬁned by (W), and W maps
Xδ to Z since z(0,T) ≤ z(0,1) for all T ∈ N and z(0,1) ∈ Z.
By Lemma 8, we have {z(t,T)} monotonically non-increasing in T > t, and it is bounded
below by U(0), so it also converges. An implication of (W) is that
W(tx) = limT→∞z(t,T) (A12)
for all t ∈ N.
24To establish (W.1), let 0x ∈ Xδ. We split up the analysis into three cases: (i) U(x0) >
W(1x); (ii) U(x0) < W(1x); (iii) U(x0) = W(1x).
In case (i), using (A12), there is some N ∈ N, such that for all T ≥ N,
U(x0) > z(1,T)
Thus, by (f) and (1), we have z(0,T) = z(1,T) for all T ≥ N. Using (W) and (A12), we
obtain W(0x) = W(1x), as required in (W.1).
In case (ii), using (A12), there is some N ∈ N, such that for all T ≥ N,
U(x0) < z(1,T)
Thus, by (f) and (1), we have z(0,T) = (1 − δ)U(x0) + δz(1,T) for all T ≥ N. Using (W)
and (A12), we obtain W(0x) = (1 − δ)U(x0) + δW(1x), as required in (W.1).
In case (iii), there are two possibilities: (a) there is a subsequence of T for which z(1,T) =
U(x0); (b) there is N ∈ N, such that for all T ≥ N, we have z(1,T) 6= U(x0). In case (a),
using (f) and (1), we have z(0,T) = z(1,T) for the subsequence of T (for which z(1,T) =
U(x0)). Thus, using (W) and (A12), we have W(0x) = W(1x). But, since U(x0) = W(1x)
in case (iii), this yields W(0x) = (1 − δ)U(x0) + δW(1x), as required in (W.1).
In case (iii)(b), either (A) there is a subsequence of T for which U(x0) < z(1,T), or (B)
there is a subsequence of T for which U(x0) > z(1,T), or both. In case (A), following the
proof of case (ii), we get W(0x) = (1 − δ)U(x0)W(1x), as required in (W.1). In case (B),
following the proof of case (i), we get W(0x) = W(1x). But, since U(x0) = W(1u) in case
(iii), this yields W(0x) = (1 − δ)U(x0) + δW(1x), as required in (W.1).
To establish (W.2), let 0x be an egalitarian stream. By (f) and (1), for each T ∈ N, we
have z(t,T) = U(x0) for t ∈ {0,...,T − 1}. Thus, (W) implies that W(0x) = U(x0).
To establish (W.3), consider 0x0, 0x00 ∈ Xδ with 0x0 ≥ 0x00. We want to show that
W(0x0) ≥ W(0x00), as required in (W.3). Deﬁne in obvious notation, for each T ∈ N, the
ﬁnite sequences {z0(0,T),...,z0(T−1,T),z0(T,T)} and {z00(0,T),...,z00(T−1,T),z00(T,T)}
as in (1). By Lemma 7 and (1), for each T ∈ N, we have z0(t,T) ≥ z00(t,T) for t ∈
{0,...,T − 1}. Then, by (W), W(0x0) ≥ W(0x00).
To establish (W.4), let 0x ∈ Xδ. We want to show that limT→∞δtW(Tx) = 0, as
required in (W.4). By Lemma 7 and (1), for each T0 ∈ N, we have




25for T ∈ {0,...,T0 − 1}. Hence, by (A12),




for T ∈ Z+. Since Z is bounded below, there does not exist ε > 0 and a subsequence
T for which δTW(Tx) ≤ −ε. Suppose there exists ε > 0 and a subsequence T for which
δTW(Tx) ≥ ε. By (A13), for all T in the subsequence,
0 < ε ≤ δTW(Tx) ≤ δT(1 − δ)
X∞
t=Tδt−TU(xt) = (1 − δ)
X∞
t=TδtU(xt).
This contradicts that limT→∞(1 − δ)
P∞
t=TδtU(xt) = 0 for all 0x ∈ Xδ. Hence, it follows
that limT→∞δtW(0x0) = 0.
A.2 Verifying the Axioms
We now verify that any SDU SWF satisﬁes the axioms O, M, IF, RD, HEF and RC: Order,
Monotonicity, Independent Future, Restricted Dominance, Hammond Equity for the Future,
and Restricted Continuity. The axioms are explained below in the course of verifying them
(observe that axiom IF implies Koopmans’ (1960) stationary condition). This entails that
any SDU SWF is a sustainable recursive SWF, as deﬁned by Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden
(2008).
To this end, ﬁx δ ∈ (0,1) and U : R+ → R satisfying (U.1), assume that the function
W : Xδ → R satisﬁes (W.1)–(W.4) (note, however, that condition (W.4) is not needed to
verify the axioms), and deﬁne a social welfare relation (SWR) % by:
For 0x0, 0x00 ∈ Xδ, 0x0 % 0x00 if and only if W(0x0) ≥ W(0x00).
By deﬁnition, then, % must be a complete order, so axiom O is satisﬁed. Further, axiom M
is equivalent to (W.3).
Axiom IF
Let 0x0, 0x00 ∈ Xδ with x0
0 = x00
0 = x0. We want to show that 0x0 % 0x00 holds if and only
if 1x0 % 1x00 to verify axiom IF.
Assume ﬁrst that 1x0 % 1x00. Then, W(0x0) ≥ W(0x00), and, by (W.1),
W(0x0) = f(U(x0),W(0x0)) (A14)
W(0x00) = f(U(x0),W(0x00)) (A15)
26Thus, applying Lemma 7, we have W(1x0) ≥ W(1x00) and 0x0 % 0x00.
Assume next that 1x0  1x00. Then, W(0x0) > W(0x00), and (A14) and (A15) hold.
Thus, by Lemma 7, we have W(1x0) > W(1x00) and 0x0  0x00.
This completes the veriﬁcation of Axiom IF since % is complete.
Axiom RD
Let 0x0, 0x00 ∈ Xδ satisfy x0
0 = x > x00
0 and x0
0 = x = x00
0 for all t ≥ 1. We want to show that
0x0  0x00 to verify axiom RD. By (W.2),
W(1x0) = U(x) = W(1x00). (A16)
Since x0
0 = x > x00
0, it follows from (A16) that U(x0
0) = W(1x0) and U(x00
0) < W(1x00).
Hence, by (W.1),
W(0x0) = (1 − δ)U(x0
0) + W(0x0) > (1 − δ)U(x00
0) + W(0x00) = W(0x00).
Axiom HEF
Let 0x0, 0x00 ∈ Xδ satisfy x0
t = x0 and x00
t = x00 for all t ≥ 1, with
x00
0 > x0
0 > x0 > x00 . (A17)
We want to show that 0x0  0x00 to verify axiom HEF. Using the fact that x0
0 > x0, we have
U(x0
0) > U(x0) = W(1x0), using (W.2). Thus, by (W.1), we must have W(0x0) = W(1x0).
Similarly, using the fact that x0
0 > x0, we have U(x00
0) > U(x00) = W(1x00), using (W.2).
Thus, by (W.1), we must have W(0x00) = W(1x00). By (A17), x0 > x00, implying that
W(1x0) = U(x0) > U(x00) = W(1x00). Thus, W(0x0) > W(0x00) holds, and so 0x0  0x00.
Axiom RC
Let 0x0, 0x00 ∈ Xδ with x0
t = x for all t ≥ 1. Let 0xn ∈ Xδ for n ∈ N with the property that







t| = 0. (A18)
We have to show that 0x0 % 0x00 to verify axiom RC.
We ﬁrst claim that W(0x00) ≤ U(x). Suppose, on the contrary, that W(0x00) > U(x).
Then, denoting W(0x00) by ξ, we note that ξ ∈ (U(x),∞).
27Choose ε0 > 0 such that U(x + ε0) < ξ. Using (A18), we can choose N ∈ N such that
xN
t ≤ x0
t + ε0 = x + ε0 for all t ≥ 1. Then, by (W.1)–(W.3) and (A1),
W(0x00) ≤ W(0xN) ≤ W(1xN) ≤ U(x0
t + ε0) < ξ = W(0x00);
a contradiction. This establishes our claim that W(0x00) ≤ U(x) Thus, we have W(0x00) ≤
W(1x0) by (W.2).
Next, we claim that W(0x00) ≤ W(0x0). Suppose, on the contrary that η := [W(0x00)−
W(0x0)] > 0. Then, by (W.2) and (W.3), we have
U(0) ≤ W(0x0) < W(0x00) ≤ U(x)
so that U(x) − U(0) ≥ η > 0. Using (A18), we can choose N ∈ N so that ¯ xN := supt≥1xN
t
and xN := inft≥1xN
t exist and
|U(xN
0 ) − U(x0
0)| < η , U(¯ xN) < U(x) + η , U(xN) > U(x) − η . (A19)
Note that it follows from (A1) that, whenever (a,b) ∈ Z2 and (a0,b0) ∈ Z2 satisfy
|a0 − a| < η and |b0 − b| < η, we must have
|f(a0,b0) − f(a,b)| < η . (A20)
We now show that:
|W(0xN) − W(0x0)| < η . (A21)
Note that by (A19), W(1xN) ≤ U(¯ xN) < U(x) + η = W(1x0) + η, using (W.2) and (W.3).
Similarly, W(1xN) ≥ U(xN) > U(x) − η = W(1x0) − η. Thus,
|W(1xN) − W(1x0)| < η . (A22)
We have W(0xN) = f(xN
0 ,W(1xN)) and W(0x0) = f(x0
0,W(1x0)). Thus, using (A19),
(A20) and (A22), we obtain (A21).
In particular, (A21) implies that:
W(0x0) + η = W(0x00) ≤ W(0xN) < W(0x0) + η ;
a contradiction. This establishes the claim that W(0x0) ≥ W(0x00) and so 0x0 % 0x00.
The same kind of argument can be used to show 0x0 - 0x00 if 0xn - 0x00 for all n ∈ N.
28A.3 Properties of Sustainable Discounted Utilitarian SWFs
We now study (given δ ∈ (0,1) and U : R+ → R satisfying (U.1)) the properties of any
function W : Xδ → R satisfying (W.1)–(W.4).
We ﬁrst state a result concerning the limit behavior of W(tx) as t → ∞ if the consump-
tion stream 0x is bounded.
Proposition 6 If W is an SDU SWF, then, for every 0x ∈ Xϕ,
(i) limt→∞W(tx) exists
(ii) limt→∞W(tx) = liminft→∞U(xt).
Proof. Since, as established in Section A.2, any SDU SWF satisﬁes the axioms O,
M, IF, RD, HEF and RC, this result follows from Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden (2008,
Proposition 7).
As reported by the following proposition, this result can be used to establish that there
is the unique SDU SWF on the set of bounded consumption streams.
Proposition 7 Any SDU SWF W restricted to Xϕ coincides with W restricted to Xϕ.
Proof. Suppose there are two SDU SWFs, call them W and V , such that W(0x) 6=
V (0x) for some 0x ∈ Xϕ. Without loss of generality, let W(0x) > V (0x). If W(1x) ≤ V (1x),
then by Lemma 7:
V (0x) = f(U(x0),V (1x)) ≥ f(U(x0),W(1x)) = W(0x)
where f is deﬁned by (f). This is a contradiction. Thus, we must have W(1x) > V (1x), and
by repeating this step we obtain:
W(tx) > V (tx) for all t ≥ 0. (A23)
We also know from Proposition 6 that:
limt→∞W(tx) = limt→∞V (tx) = liminft→∞U(xt). (A24)
Thus, deﬁning a sequence {kt} by kt = [W(tx)−V (tx)] for all t ≥ 0, we see from (A23) and
(A24) that kt > 0 for all t ≥ 0, and kt → 0 as t → ∞. It follows that there is some n for
which we must have kn+1 < kn. That is, we have:
0 < [W(n+1x) − V (n+1x)] < [W(nx) − V (nx)]. (A25)
29We then consider three possibilities: (i) U(xn) ≥ W(n+1x), (ii) U(xn) ≤ V (n+1x), and
(iii) V (n+1x) < U(xn) < W(n+1x). If (i) holds, then U(xn) > W(n+1x), and so we have by
(W.1):
(i) W(nx) = W(n+1x)





But (A26) clearly contradicts (A25).
If (ii) holds, then U(xn) < W(n+1x), and so we have by (W.1):
(i) W(nx) = (1 − δ)U(xn) + W(n+1x)





But (A27) implies that [W(nx)−V (nx)] = δ[W(n+1x)−V (n+1x)], which again contradicts
(A25).
If (iii) holds, then we have by (W.1):
(i) W(nx) = (1 − δ)U(xn) + W(n+1x)





By (A28)(i) and U(xn) < W(n+1x), we get W(nx) < (1 − δ)W(n+1x) + δW(n+1x) =
W(n+1x), and so by (A28)(ii), we get [W(nx)−V (nx)] = [W(nx)−V (n+1x)] < [W(n+1x)−
V (n+1x)], which again contradicts (A25).
Since these are the only possibilities, there do not exist two SDU SWFs, W and V , such
that W(0x) 6= V (0x) for some 0x ∈ Xϕ. The result follows since, by Proposition 5, W is an
SDU SWF.
A.4 Non-Uniqueness of Sustainable Discounted Utilitarian SWF
This uniqueness result does not carry over to unbounded consumption streams. To show
this, we provide another function W : Xδ → R satisfying (W.1)–(W.4). Let 0x ∈ Xϕ be
given. For each T ∈ N, deﬁne the ﬁnite sequence { ˜ w(0,T),..., ˜ w(T − 1,T), ˜ w(T,T)} as
follows:
˜ w(T,T) = liminft→∞U(xt)
˜ w(T − 1,T) = f(U(xT−1), ˜ w(T,T))
···
˜ w(0,T) = f(U(x0), ˜ w(1,T))

      
      
We now deﬁne ˜ W(0x) on Xϕ by
˜ W(0x) := limT→∞ ˜ w(0,T). ( ˜ W)
30Extend the domain of ˜ W to Xδ as follows. If 0x ∈ Xδ\Xϕ has the property that liminft→∞
U(xt) exists, then the algorithm ( ˜ W) is still applicable. If 0x ∈ Xδ\Xϕ does not have this






n if ∀τ ≥ t, xτ ≥ n
xt if ∃τ ≥ t s.t. xτ < n,
and, since 0xn ∈ Xϕ for each n ∈ N, deﬁne ˜ W(0x) in the following way:
˜ W(0x) := limn→∞ ˜ W(0xn).
It can be shown that ˜ W : Xδ → R satisﬁes (W.1)–(W.4) and is thus an SDU SWF.
Example of non-uniqueness. Let δ = 1
2 and U(x) = xa, where 1
2 < a < 1, implying that









a, 0, ...) ∈ X 1
2,
leading to the utility stream 0u = (1, 0, 2, 0, 4, 0, 8, 0, ...). Then
˜ W(0x) = 0 < 1 = W(0x).
It turns out, however, that W provides an upper bound for SDU welfare. This is stated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Any SDU SWF W satisﬁes W(0x) ≤ W(0x) for all 0x ∈ Xδ.
To prove this result we need the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Assume that W is an SDU SWF. If 0x ∈ Xδ, then, for all t ∈ Z+, W(tx) ≤
w(tx).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there is some τ ≥ 0 such that
ε := W(τx) − w(τx) > 0. (A29)
It follows from (W.1) that, for all t,
W(tx) = f(U(xt),W(t+1x)) ≤ (1 − δ)U(xt) + δW(t+1x),
31where f is deﬁned by (f), while the deﬁnition of w entails that, for all t, w(tx) = (1 −
δ)U(xt) + δw(t+1x). Hence, (A29) implies that, for all t > τ,
W(tx) − w(tx) ≥
ε
δt−τ .
It now follows from (U.1) and the deﬁnition of w that, for all t > τ,
δtW(tx) ≥ δtw(tx) + δτε ≥ δtU(0) + δτε.
This in turn implies the existence of T ≥ τ such that, for all t > T,
δtW(tx) ≥ 1
2δτε > 0,
thereby contradicting that W satisﬁes (W.4).
Proof of Proposition 8. Let 0x ∈ Xδ. By Lemma 9 and (1), for all T ∈ N,
W(Tx) ≤ w(Tx) = z(T,T). Furthermore, by (W.1) and (1), for all t ∈ {0,...,T − 1},
W(tx) = f(U(xt),W(t+1x))
w(t,T) = f(U(xt),z(t + 1,T)),
where f is deﬁned by (f). By using Lemma 7 repeatedly, we obtain:
W(0x) ≤ z(0,T).
Since this holds for any T ∈ N, the results follows from (W).
A.5 Properties of Minimum Functions
Since the properties of f play a crucial role in determining the existence as well as the
properties of SDU SWFs, it is of interest to study the nature of the function, f, deﬁned
by (f). This, in turn, leads to an analysis of properties of the “min” function. While these
properties are elementary, they are not available in texts for ready reference. The purpose of
this subsection is to provide a self-contained analysis of basic properties of “min” functions.
To this end, we study a function g : Y × Y → Y, deﬁned by:
g(a,b) = min{a,b} (g)
We now prove that g has the following properties.
(1) Monotonicity: If (a,b) ∈ Z2 and (a0,b0) ∈ Z2, and (a0,b0) ≥ (a,b), then g(a0,b0) ≥
g(a,b).
32Proof. Without loss of generality, let g(a,b) = a. Then, b ≥ a and so b0 ≥ b ≥ a. If
g(a0,b0) = a0, then g(a0,b0) = a0 ≥ a = g(a,b). If g(a0,b0) = b0, then g(a0,b0) = b0 ≥ b ≥ a =
g(a,b).
(2) Uniformity: If (a,b) ∈ Z2 and ε > 0, then:
(i) g(a + ε,b + ε) = g(a,b) + ε if (a + ε,b + ε) ∈ Z2 ,
(ii) g(a − ε,b − ε) = g(a,b) − ε if (a − ε,b − ε) ∈ Z2 .
Proof. Without loss of generality let g(a,b) = a, so that b ≥ a. If (a + ε,b + ε) ∈ Z2,
then since b +ε ≥ a+ε, we have g(a+ε,b+ε) = a+ε = g(a,b) +ε. If (a−ε, b −ε) ∈ Z2,
then since b − ε ≥ a − ε, we have g(a − ε,b − ε) = a − ε = g(a,b) − ε.
(3) Continuity: Let us deﬁne the open interval (U(0),∞) by S. If (a,b) ∈ S2 and
(a0,b0) ∈ S2, and ε > 0 satisfy
|a0 − a| < ε, and |b0 − b| < ε, (A30)
then:
|g(a0,b0) − g(a,b)| < ε. (A31)
Proof. Given (A30), we can choose ε0 ∈ (0,ε), such that 0 < a − ε0 < a + ε0 < 1,
0 < b − ε0 < b + ε0 < 1, and
|a0 − a| ≤ ε0, and |b0 − b| ≤ ε0 .
Then, we have a0 ≤ a + ε0 < 1 and b0 ≤ b + ε0 < 1, so that, using the monotonicity and
uniformity properties of g, we obtain:
g(a0,b0) ≤ g(a + ε0,b + ε0) = g(a,b) + ε0 < g(a,b) + ε. (A32)
Similarly, we have a0 ≥ a − ε0 > 0 and b0 ≥ b − ε0 > 0, so that, using the monotonicity and
uniformity properties of g, we obtain:
g(a0,b0) ≥ g(a − ε0,b − ε0) = g(a,b) − ε0 > g(a,b) − ε. (A33)
Clearly, (A32) and (A33) imply (A31).
Remark. The properties of g can be applied to the function f, deﬁned by (f) since
f(a,b) = g((1 − δ)a + δb,b) for all (a,b) ∈ Z2 .
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